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ABSTRACT 
Purpose. Research into adaptational processes has sometimes been confusing as regards 
differentiating coping and defense mechanisms. This theoretical discussion is based on 
Cramer’s (1998a) effort to disentangle the two concepts concerning the psychological 
processes involved, as well as acknowledge their mutual overlapping. Although such an effort 
is needed, at the same time several issues should be re-addressed and further implications on 
the differentiation of coping and defense processes discussed, such as consciousness and 
intentionality, functionality, adaptiveness, and the question of trait v state.  
Methods. Based on Cramer’s (1998a) review, a search was conducted for current models on 
defense and coping that address the afore-mentioned implications. Only theoretical models 
that differentiate the defense and coping concepts, without necessarily presenting related 
empirical evidence, were taken into account.  
Results. Recent integrative models of defense and coping yield a more differentiated picture 
with regard to these issues: coping includes conscious and unconscious efforts, coping and 
defense serve very similar functions, adaptiveness can be defined in qualitative (defenses) and 
quantitative (coping) terms and the question of stability of defenses and coping needs to be 
more fully explored empirically. Furthermore, the nature of the underlying fear can be 
theoretically differentiated and related to the difference between coping and defense. Also, the 
implication of competence-related aspects of functioning (coping) and of internal 
determinants of functioning (defense) is discussed.  
Conclusions. Implications for research perspectives implying defense and coping concepts 
based on observer-rating methodology are proposed. 
 
Key-Words: Coping, Defense Mechanism, Psychotherapy Integration, Adaptational Process
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COPING AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS: WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? – SECOND 
ACT 
When P. Cramer (1998a) wrote her paper on coping and defense mechanisms, the 
author chose an evocative subtitle: “What’s the difference?”. This simple phrase aiming at 
clarification reflects well the current knowledge about the issue: there are a host of empirical 
studies, based on a variety of conceptions, more or less theory-driven, leaving researchers and 
theoreticians somewhat overwhelmed. Confronted with so many ways to deal with adversity – 
from concrete behavioral strategies to emotion regulation and to intra-psychic counter-
cathectic processes –, one might wonder “Does distinction really make a difference?” 
The afore-mentioned paper makes it clear that the answer is at the same time yes and 
no, depending on the conceptual criterion applied. It also becomes evident that Cramer’s 
(1998a) comparative view was greatly needed and is therefore very helpful for further studies 
and elaborations. Thus, the present literature review will be based on Cramer’s work. For 
example, confusion surrounding the topic has been lessened by the introduction of the term of 
“adaptational process” (Cramer, 1998a, p. 920) encompassing coping and defense, based on 
the assumption that both serve the individual’s need for adaptation to reality. Within this over-
arching definition, the following definitions of coping and defense will be used, for the latter 
in accordance with Cramer’s choice of definition: “Defense mechanisms – i.e., mental 
mechanisms that alter veridical perception – [are] postulated to function so as to protect the 
person from excessive anxiety, whether the source of that anxiety be the perception of a 
disturbing external event or the presence of a disruptive internal psychological state (e.g., a 
wish, drive or fear)” (A. Freud, 1936, p. 43, cited by Cramer, 1998a, p. 920) and coping as 
“overt and covert behaviors that are taken to reduce or eliminate psychological  distress or 
stressful conditions” (Fleishman, 1984, p. 229, cited by Holahan & Moos, 1987, p. 946). This 
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definition was chosen, as it underlines the functionality of coping processes, a characteristic I 
consider central to Cramer’s concept of overarching adaptational processes.  
However, several conceptual issues on integration of defense mechanisms and coping 
addressed by Cramer need to be re-addressed and re-evaluated. At least two recent theoretical 
models were not discussed in Cramer’s review (i.e., the ones by Chabrol and Callahan, 2004, 
and by Steffens and Kächele, 1988) ; clinical and methodological implications are not 
sufficiently put forward in Cramer’s review. Moreover, more elaboration is needed on the 
issues of consciousness, the nature of underlying fear, functionality and hierarchies of 
adaptiveness. Thus, after the first act by Cramer, a second act is needed. This implies that the 
current review may be understood as extension of the afore-mentioned. 
This article aims at maintaining, as far as possible, clear-cut definitions of defense 
mechanisms on the one hand and coping on the other and preparing hypotheses which can be 
empirically tested. I will first extend Cramer’s review of models of defense and coping – both 
historical and recent – which will be evaluated according to their empirical and clinical 
usefulness, their integrative tendency, as well as regarding issues of conceptual overlappings, 
sequential links between defense and coping, and their inherent limitations. Finally, several 
issues raised by Cramer will be discussed – consciousness, intentionality, adaptiveness and 
trait v state -, based on the models presented. 
Historical Models of Defense and Coping 
Two historical models were documented by Cramer (1998a), Haan’s and Plutchik’s. I 
will re-examine them from a modern vantage point, in order to learn more about shortcomings 
and strengths of research in the field. 
Haan’s (1977) three-fold model is based on three levels of Ego functioning: (a) 
optimal functioning described by coping strategies, (b) non-optimal functioning by defense 
mechanisms and (c) Ego failure. Ten basic Ego processes have been defined: discrimination, 
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detachment, means-end-symbolization, delayed response, sensitivity, time reversion, selective 
awareness, diversion, transformation and restraint. Associated to these processes are ten 
specific processes nested within the levels. The author suggests that a given Ego process in an 
individual is potentially pervasive on all three levels; facing adversity, the individual deploys 
a specific coping; if this is insufficient, the person uses the corresponding defense and, if 
necessary, the corresponding Ego failure process. Thus, Haan formulates a model of 
psychopathology close to the Freudian conception of a continuum between normal and 
pathological states.  
In this model, coping and defense are clearly differentiated (Haan, 1977; 1982), coping 
being defined as mechanisms eliciting secondary processes of thought allowing the individual 
deliberate and flexible choice and efficient affect modulation and expression; defense being 
defined as mechanisms referring to primary processes of thought deforming reality and 
putting the individual in a situation of non-voluntary and rigid functioning. No conceptual 
overlap is considered in Haan’s model. The temporal sequence of coping preceding defense - 
emerging when coping fails - is postulated by the model. 
The principal limitation of the three-fold theory is its definition of coping as optimal 
and defense as non-optimal processes (Parker & Endler, 1996; Perry, 1990), reflecting the 
state-of-the-art definition of the time when N. Haan wrote her books. Later, the concept of 
defense encompasses adaptive, along with maladaptive, mechanisms, inasmuch as the concept 
of coping describes maladaptive, along with adaptive, processes. Thus, the 30 processes 
described perfectly reflect the three-fold model, but account for neither current psychoanalytic 
conceptions nor cognitive-behavioral theories. 
Only very little empirical research has been conducted to test the model (see Haan, 
1977 for an overview), all categories of coping and defense are theory-driven. The clinical 
relevance of the model is important, especially for diagnostic purposes of psychopathology.  
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With his psycho-evolutionary theory of emotion studying adaptation of organisms to 
emergency, Plutchik (1995) developed another integrative model of basic adaptational 
processes. According to this theory, ego defenses and coping styles are derivatives of eight 
basic emotions (depicted in subjective terms: fear, anger, joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, 
expectation and surprise) in conflict with anxiety yielding in the individual a defensive stance. 
A correspondence is established between each basic emotion and a specific defense 
mechanism and a specific coping style. Factor-analytic methodology (Plutchik,  Kellerman, & 
Conte, 1979) has confirmed these eight basic defenses; however, so far, no full replicative 
validation study confirming the complete model is known (Grebot, Paty, & Girard Dephanix, 
2006 for a partial replication). Included as defenses are: repression, displacement, reaction 
formation, compensation, denial, projection, intellectualization and regression; and as coping: 
avoidance, substitution, reversal, replacement, minimization, fault finding, mapping and help 
seeking. Each pair of corresponding category serves a specific function of survival, postulated 
as important for both humans and higher-order animals. In this model, defense and coping are 
clearly distinguished, ego defense being defined as  “unconscious, rigid [processes] of limited 
adaptive value to an immature Ego” and coping styles as “conscious methods of solving 
problems, flexible and generally adaptive”. (Plutchik, 1995, p. 30, italics by the author). No 
overlapping, but a clear correspondence between each defense and coping style in terms of a 
derivative is postulated. The main force – at the same time a limitation - of Plutchik’s model 
is to simplify the list of defenses and coping. For the researcher on the one hand, this might be 
a welcome variable reduction. For the therapists on the other hand, it seems difficult to accept 
this reduced version of highly-developed theories of defense or coping; its implementation in 
clinical practice seems therefore limited. The question of consciousness of the processes, as 
defined by Plutchik (1995), will be addressed in the Discussion section. 
Current Models of Defense and Coping 
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 In Cramer’s (1998a) review, at least two recent integrative attempts on defense and 
coping were not included, due to the fact that at that point in time, no publication in English 
was available, the models by Chabrol and Callahan (2004) and by Steffens and Kächele 
(1988). 
Chabrol and Callahan (2004) developed a conception describing the functional 
organisation of defense and coping. They postulate that defense and coping usually occur at 
adjacent moments, but not simultaneously, in situations of everyday life or in the patient’s 
narrative in psychotherapy. Temporal proximity has already intrigued other theorists, such as 
Haan (1977) and Vaillant (2000), who postulated a typical sequential order: first the 
individual tries to solve the problem associated with stress or conflict by engaging in coping 
processes, second, if they fail, the individual uses defenses which are conceived as less 
adaptive (see above). Chabrol and Callahan (2004) suggest that this approach is rather 
simplistic corresponding neither to clinical observations, nor to modern conceptions of coping 
and defense, and these authors propose a sequential model where defense mechanisms 
precede coping processes. Thus, defense remains a personality-related concept, very close to 
its Freudian definition (Freud, 1926), nevertheless dynamic, whereas coping processes are 
used once the individual’s basic unconscious defensive stance (with several levels of 
adaptiveness) has been established. Within this model, coping processes can still be adaptive, 
even when preceding defenses are not necessarily adaptive, and inversely, adaptive defenses 
can also precede dysfunctional coping, but the coping-preceded-by-defense will be based on 
the altered perception of the reality related to defense. This sequential hypothesis is consistent 
with the assumptions by Heim, Augustiny and Blaser (1983) and has several interesting 
clinical implications (see Ihilevich & Gleser, 1991); in particular it elicits potential limitations 
of coping enhancement training, as well as defense interpretation techniques. It might suggest 
that clinicians should be attentive to coping resources – in highlighting and activating them – 
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at the same time formulating a defense interpretation, as the latter may  be stressful for the 
patient. Inversely, working on enhancing coping presumes the related defense for the 
particular situation must be clarified (see also Grawe, 1998; Sachse, 2003, for the links 
between clarification and coping enhancement techniques in psychotherapy). 
 The model refers to the definition of defenses by A. Freud (1936) and the definition 
of coping by Holahan and Moos (1987). Overlappings between the two concepts seem 
possible, but are not substantial. An overall conceptual link is postulated in terms of 
synergetics between defense mechanisms and coping. Defense mechanisms facilitate or 
impede the realisation of the cognitive- or behavior-oriented coping. Adaptive coping may be 
restricted by underlying immature defense mechanisms and potentialized by underlying 
mature defense mechanisms. A recent study realised on 190 psychology graduates yields 
moderate correlations between immature defenses (using the DSQ-40) and maladaptive 
coping processes (using the Brief COPE), as well as moderate correlations between mature 
defenses and adaptive coping (Callahan & Chabrol, 2004). So far, to our knowledge, the 
sequential link has only partially been confirmed by an unpublished study on 20 
psychotherapy sessions using independent observer-rater methodologies applied to session-
transcripts. Only 36% of all rated defenses are immediately followed by a coping process, 
suggesting substantial loss of information on individual defensive and coping profiles, 
because the remaining 64% of defense mechanisms stood alone, without being immediately 
followed by a specific coping process (Kramer, 2005b).  
Finally, Steffens and Kächele (1988) proposed another model where the individual’s 
need for adaptation to reality represents the missing link between coping and defense; both 
categories of processes serve this same function (see also Cramer, 1998a). A clear-cut 
distinction is made with regard to two criteria: the status of fear and the impact of novel 
situations to be faced by the individual. With reference to Freud (1926), realistic anxiety 
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(“Realangst”) is differentiated from neurotic fear (based on idiosyncratic conflict 
constellation; see also Hartmann, 1958); defenses operate in the case of the latter, whereas 
coping is the answer to the former. Thus, in new situations -  which means they are unusual to 
the individual -, both processes are activated at the same time and have clearly distinctive 
functions,  i.e., sub-functions of adaptation. In a stressful situation, both types of fears 
(realistic anxiety and neurotic fear) might be activated and these are neutralized by means of 
defenses and coping. By developing this point, one may assume the signal-anxiety as 
proximal cause for both defense and coping, whereas the presence of neurotic fear related to 
inner conflict as distal cause only for defense (see also Sjöbäck, 1973).  
Steffens and Kächele give the following example: in a person given a diagnosis of 
chronic illness (e.g., cancer), (1) Defenses are activated in order to contain the resurgence of 
traumatic memories or fantasies related to death, loss, disintegration or castration and (2) 
Coping processes are activated to face the novel and threatening situation, in a so-called 
conflict-free zone of the Ego.  Two basic coping processes are proposed: allo-plastic and auto-
plastic (Hartmann, 1958; see also Perrez, & Reicherts, 1992, for an elaborated definition). 
Thus, the conflict-free zone of the Ego is only created, if the defensive process is sufficiently 
effective. We should note that this definition of conflict-free zone in the dynamics of the 
interplay between defense and coping does not completely overlap with Hartmann’s (1958) 
definition of “conflict-free sphere”, elaborated strictly on the basis of psychoanalytic theory. 
Nevertheless, Steffens and Kächele’s assumption is consistent with the traditional 
psychoanalytic definition of defenses (Freud, 1894; A. Freud, 1936;  Hartmann, 1958; Moser, 
1964) underlining the primacy of internal stressors, mainly traumatic memories and fantasies, 
as main triggers of defenses.  Steffens and Kächele’s (1988) conception is also consistent with 
the transactional theory by Lazarus (1991; Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984) emphasizing situation-
dependency of coping. The assumption of simultaneity contradicts Chabrol and Callahan 
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(2004), but is an argument in favor of parallel processing in facing adversity, underlined also 
by appraisal research (Scherer, 1984). The model does not exclude a dynamical shift from 
defenses to coping and vice-versa, thus partially undermining clear-cut boundaries between 
the two concepts. Hence, defenses, if induced by a situation, might be used as direct 
adaptation and thus, become coping for a given situation. On the other hand, if adaptational 
processes (defenses or coping) are used in a pervasive manner – the same process being 
implacably overused in many different situations -, one must assume the existence of an 
underlying internal conflict eliciting defensive manoeuvres (and not coping). This seems to 
contradict certain definitions of defense and coping trying to maintain a clear independence 
(see Bouchard & Thériault, 2003). It may be argued that if overused coping characterized by 
stability across different situations is called coping or defense, this is a theoretical question 
which should be resolved for a particular clinical situation (with limited generalizability), 
based on empirical data available as to the presence of an internal conflict associated with the 
process.  
 In conclusion, according to the basic assumption by Steffens and Kächele, defense and 
coping are clearly distinguished. However, the authors do not exclude the dynamical 
transition, under specific conditions, between the two. This transition might account for what 
in other – more static – conceptions is called conceptual overlap between defense and coping. 
In Steffens et al.’s conception, the overlap phenomenon is clinically and theoretically 
accounted for, with a rationale of pervasiveness of adaptational processes related to internal 
conflicts being provided. The model postulates an overall link between defense and coping, 
where the creation of a conflict-free zone in the Ego is central, as well as different types of 
fears elicited by novel situations. So far, no empirical evidence supports the model, although, 
Küchenhoff and Manz (1993) have corroborated part of a derived model. From a clinical 
vantage point, however, this integrative conception is consistent with several clinical theories, 
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above all Freud’s defense theory and Lazarus’ stress-coping model and therefore, thus both its 
clinical implementation and its empirical exploration seem promising. 
DISCUSSION 
As shown by the presentation of models of defense and coping, Cramer’s (1998a) 
discussion of the question lacks several current references and thus, needs to be reviewed 
taking into account these modern conceptions of defense and coping. This is the aim of the 
present second act. I will review the issues of consciousness and intentionality, 
instrumentality, adaptiveness and trait-state discussion, among others raised by Cramer. 
Finally, argument will be put forward in favor of theory-consistent methodology for 
assessment of defense and coping. 
Consciousness 
As suggested by Cramer (1998a), the question of consciousness is related to the 
question of intentionality, without both concepts being perfectly overlapped by each other. 
Unconscious processes may have conscious correlates, but the motive - or intention - of the 
adaptational process is generally concealed from consciousness, as may be the process as a 
whole. Therefore, we discuss the two questions together (for an opposing view, see 
Newman’s reaction, 2001). Defenses, especially non-adaptive ones, are usually defined as 
processes with an important unconscious part (Freud, 1926; Perry, 1990). The question is less 
clear for coping and adaptive defenses. Cramer refers to suppression, traditionally categorized 
as mature defense (Vaillant, 1977), but implying “a semiconscious decision to defer paying 
attention” (Vaillant, 1990, p. 262, cited by Cramer, 1998a, p. 925). Based on the argument 
that suppression thus involves “conscious intention to not allow some thought or event to 
create psychological disturbance”, Cramer would suggest it be categorized as coping (see also 
Haan, 1977, for the distinction between suppression and repression). This argument needs to 
be challenged, since it is based on a static conception of adaptational processes. In line with 
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Steffens and Kächele (1988), it can be argued that suppression might be understood as coping 
and as defense, depending on the type of fear to be contained in the subject and depending on 
its functionality in novel situations: the question would be: “does this process aim at direct 
adaptation to external reality – facing realistic anxiety - or at creating an internal conflict-free 
zone – facing neurotic fear?”. Depending on the response to this question, suppression in a 
given situation would be classified as coping or as defense. A similar argument might be 
advanced in answer to the question as to whether denial is a defense or a coping (Sjöbäck, 
1973). 
 The second argument raised by Cramer is that the conscious status of coping is one of 
the main distinctive features of coping processes (as opposed to defenses). Paradoxically, 
Cramer (1998a) herself mentions divergent opinions of coping researchers on this tricky 
question. Certain do not exclude un- or pre-conscious coping (Erdelyi; 1985, 2001; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984), others claim that coping can only be conscious (Parker, & Endler, 1996; 
Singer, & Sincoff, 1990; Suls, & Harvey, 1996), but these opposing views are discussed 
neither with regard to theory nor to empirical data. Cramer (1998a, p. 924) concludes that “the 
majority of coping researchers see these processes as under the conscious control of the 
person”. We would argue, along with Steffens and Kächele (1988, p. 41) that “(…) coping 
processes on the other hand may certainly occur automatically and thus, may be described as 
being unconscious, however, they are not - as Ego strategies – anchored within unconscious 
conflicts” [translated by the author]. The latter is reserved for defense mechanisms. Thus, we 
may have to admit that, at least theoretically, the non-conscious status of an adaptational 
process alone does not inform us if we are dealing with a defensive or a coping process (see 
also the discussion of Cramer’s paper by Newman, 2001, Erdelyi, 2001; and Cramer’s 
reaction, 2001). According to Steffens and Kächele (1988), one needs to be able to identify an 
internal conflict in the individual in order to talk of a defense; coping does not require this 
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type of adversity. This theory-driven conception is consistent with most conceptions on 
coping, as it is generally understood as a strategy against situation-related adversity, whether 
the strategy is conscious, preconscious or unconscious for the individual (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984; Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003; Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996). 
 In conclusion, in order to be able to answer the question of the (un-)conscious status of 
coping, one needs to compare several methodologies of coping assessment, i.e., self-ratings 
and observer-ratings (see Kramer, Drapeau, Khazaal, & Bodenmann, 2009; Tschuschke, 
Pfleiderer, Denzinger, Hertenstein, Kächele, & Arnold, 1994). Consistent and systematic 
overlap would be an argument in favor of conscious processes, whereas inconsistency in the 
results would argue in favor of the existence of unconscious coping; research into this 
question is therefore warranted. 
Functionality 
As suggested by Cramer (1998a), there is consistent overlap – or maybe even no 
difference - between the two main functions of coping and defense: (1) To reduce negative 
affect/ward off disruptive negative affect, and (2) Return to baseline functioning/restore a 
comfortable level of functioning. Thus, functions of defense and coping can be described as 
(1) Affect regulating, and (2) Maintaining homeostasis of the system. In this sense, the 
functionality of defense and coping may be paralleled to the concept of “Plan” in the Plan 
Analysis approach (Caspar, 1996), which we draw on to illustrate the afore-mentioned 
consistent overlap between defense and coping on an individualized level.  Plan Analysis 
differentiates between interactive and intra-psychic goals – motives – and means, the latter 
being instrumentally related to these goals. For instance, a patient with traumatic memories of 
his childhood tends to “forget” these in a given current stressful situation and might use a 
repression. This defense, which might be described as a Plan (Caspar, 1996) “Do everything 
to forget the painful experience” or “Avoid thinking about the traumatic event”, serves 
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instrumentally a higher-order plan which might be called “Avoid upsetting emotions”.  Thus, 
the afore-mentioned function (1) of repression aiming at affect regulation is explained. 
Moreover, these Plans might also serve another higher-order Plan, such as  “Avoid talking in 
therapy about the trauma” or “Avoid engaging fully in therapy”. Such Plans illustrate the 
afore-mentioned function (2) of repression as defense, which is the maintenance of 
homeostasis of the system. Moreover, the hierarchy of Plans illustrates the means-end 
relationships and thus, overlaps with the functionality being inherent in defense and coping 
concepts.  
Even if the Plan Analysis approach overlaps partially with defense and coping 
concepts, there are substantial differences, where Plan Analysis clearly surpasses the defense-
coping concepts, such as the tailor-made description of Plans aiming at individualized case 
conceptualizations, the differentiation between intra-psychic and interpersonal regulation 
processes as Plans, the explicit instrumental links between behaviors, Plans and motives, as 
well as the instrumental function of emotions in relation with Plans (Caspar, 2007). 
To sum up, functionality allows consistent overlap between defense and coping, and 
might even be the Achilles heel of adaptational processes – thus, the necessary condition for 
adaptiveness to be produced; without functionality of a process, the studied process ought not 
be adaptational, but embedded in a momentary adversity-free context requiring no adaptation. 
We therefore agree with Cramer (1998a): coping and defense cannot be differentiated on the 
sole criterion of functionality. Empirical evidence for the conclusion of non-differentiation of 
defense and coping with regard to their functionality is provided by studies on marital 
adjustment (Bouchard, & Thériault, 2003), on adjustment in normal adolescents (Erickson, 
Feldmann, & Steiner, 1997), on sports performance in professional kayakers (Nicolas, & 
Jebrane, 2008) and on adjustment after lumbar discectomy (Fulde, Junge & Ahrens, 1995). 
Adaptiveness 
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 The question of hierarchy of defenses or coping, according to the criterion of 
adaptiveness, has been discussed (Cramer, 1998a). Adaptiveness might depend on at least 
three criteria, initially developed for the concept of coping, but certainly valid for all kinds of 
adaptational processes (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003): the long-term developmental 
consequences of  the process (a question being “What are the long-term costs?”), its 
subjective experience (“What does it feel like to practice this process?”) and the current 
qualities (“How can this process be described?”).  
For defense mechanisms, a hierarchical organisation ranging from maladaptive 
defenses to mature defenses is widely accepted in psychoanalytic thinking (Cramer, 1991; 
Perry, 1990, 1993; Vaillant, 1977, 1993). However, in coping research, coping processes are 
rarely ranked according to their degree of adaptiveness. Some researchers describe good news 
versus bad news coping (Aldwin, & Revenson, 1987), but critics of this dichotomic 
conception are frequent (Kramer, 2005a, Lazarus, 2000; Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003). 
Cramer (1998a) does not exclude a “horizontal hierarchy” describing coping processes as they 
unfold across a specific and limited period of time (sequential model: Aspinwall, & Taylor; 
1997; Carver, & Scheier, 1981; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Rothbaum, Weisz, Snyder, 1982; 
Tennen, & Affleck, 1997). There are also several attempts to classify coping along a more 
complex hierarchy; for instance, within a three-level-model (Leventhal, Suls, & Leventhal, 
1993). With some exceptions, it can be concluded that vertical hierarchy is associated to 
defense, whereas horizontal (sequential) hierarchy is linked to coping. 
 Along with Costa, Somerfield and McCrae (1996) and Cramer (1998a), qualitative 
differences in defenses account for adaptiveness (see also A. Freud. 1936, for a discussion) – 
meaning that some defenses are more mature than others -, whereas quantitative criteria might 
apply to the degree of adaptiveness of coping – meaning that any given coping is maladaptive 
if practiced in a highly frequent manner (“overused”). Therefore, for optimal adaptation, an 
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individual should engage in mature – high-level – defense mechanisms and at the same time 
avoid practicing any coping too frequently (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003). This 
hypothesis is theory-driven and needs to be tested empirically. Recent models of defense and 
coping (Steffens & Kächele, 1988) suggest an overused coping be called defense, due to the 
underlying internal conflict postulated. We would argue that as long as the underlying internal 
conflict has not been reliably assessed in the given clinical situation, coping may be used 
recurrently, without it becoming a defense. Only empirical research might answer the 
question of internal conflict being associated with frequent use of a specific coping.  
Trait v State 
The question of trait v state of defense and coping has been tackled by several 
researchers (Cramer, 1998a). Underlying this distinction is the empirical question of stability 
over time of an adaptational process in a given individual. On a theoretical level, we 
differentiate between personality-driven processes (defense mechanisms) and situation-
induced processes (coping processes) (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; Cramer, 1998a; Steffens & 
Kächele, 1988). In this respect, Cramer (1998a) concludes that one is facing mere tendencies, 
rather than a criteria yielding clear-cut differentiation between defense and coping. I only 
partially agree, in view of recent integrative models (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; Steffens, & 
Kächele, 1988) and empirical findings (using self-report questionnaires: Whitty, 2003; using 
observer-rated methods: Kramer, 2009 and Kramer, de Roten, Michel, & Despland, 2009). A 
closer look at the question yields the following: it is common to conceive defenses as 
personality-driven constructs (aspect of trait), elicited by intra-psychic or external conflicts 
(Bergeret, 1985; Cooper, 1998; Kernberg, 1984; Perry, 1993); this would imply both a trait- 
and state-aspect of defenses (see also Drapeau, de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003, for the 
question of stability and fluctuation of defenses over psychotherapy). Facing the same 
unconscious conflict, the individual does not need to defend him-/herself by using the same 
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defense across situations, but tends to use certain defenses more often than others, yielding a 
profile of typical defensive patterns, which undergoes only limited fluctuation over time 
(Cramer, 1998b; Perry, & Cooper, 1989; Perry, 1993; see also Vaillant, 1976, for the long-
term developmental course of defenses in adulthood). For coping, on the other hand, the 
particularities of the situation and its subjective appraisal by the individual (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984) determine the coping process involved, not directly the individual’s 
personality nor the nature of inner conflicts. This implies higher fluctuation for coping over 
time, compared to defenses. Of course, appraisal research shows links of coping with stable 
personality-variables (which are aspects of trait; Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Costa, 
& McCrae, 1990; Hewitt, & Flett, 1996; see also Beutler, Harwood, Alimohamed, & Malik, 
2002), but theoretically, coping is conceived as situation-induced, thus rather reflecting the 
concept of state (Cramer, 1998a; Kramer, 2005a, Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984; Perrez, & 
Reicherts, 1992). This distinction implies the differentiation of determinants in adaptational 
processes: coping is essentially externally determined – a concept related to the individual 
level of competence in adaptation, whereas defenses are essentially internally determined – a 
concept implying a certain degree of reality-distorted perception. As a result, at least 
theoretically, clear-cut differentiation can be obtained, as defenses encompass trait- and state-
aspects, whereas coping is associated to state. However, it is high time this conception be 
better understood by being tested empirically (see the conclusions by Whitty, 2003). 
Measurement of Coping and Defense in Clinical Psychology 
 The issue of accurate measurement has been addressed by several scholars and 
researchers, separately for coping (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus, & Folkman,  
1984; Endler, & Parker, 1990; Perrez, & Reicherts, 1996) and defenses (Cramer, 1991; Haan, 
1977; Perry, 1990). The clinical v research origins of the two concepts are generally reflected 
by the assessment strategies: clinician-rated evaluation systems of defenses, versus self-report 
                                                                  COPING AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS – SECOND ACT   18
measures, i.e., questionnaires, self-observational methodologies regarding coping. Whereas 
the former tend to yield high external – clinical and theoretical – validity (Perry, 1993; Perry, 
& Henry, 2004), but may suffer from flaws in inter-rater reliability, the latter tend to show 
high internal validity and reliability  - on subscales produced by factor-analytic procedures - 
but potentially suffer from low external validity, low theory-consistency and limited 
usefulness for clinical psychology, due to the low level of complexity in the assessable 
concepts with such methods. 
 Related to this classical divergence in measurement is the differentiation between 
defense and coping in unconscious and conscious processes (see Discussion section). 
Assessment of coping by means of solely self-report measures is prone to distorted 
perceptions of self, manipulative tendencies or lies, which might be the consequences of 
unconscious adaptational processes. On the contrary, assessment of defenses and coping by 
means of clinician- or observer-rater systems would seem unnecessary if postulated that such 
processes are conscious for the individual; in this case, questionnaires or self-observation 
methodologies would suffice. Based on the afore-mentioned discussion, one should leave 
open the query as to whether coping is conscious or not, and thus, should opt for observer-
rater methodology, in addition to self-report measures for assessing coping and defenses 
(Cramer, 2000; Kramer, 2005a; Kramer, 2009; Lazarus, 2000; Perry, 1993; Tschuschke, et al., 
1994).  Observer-rater methods are also accurate ways of controlling for biases due to social 
desirability, acquiescing, interpersonally manipulative and self-deceptive tendencies. Such 
methodology responds optimally to the complexity inherent in clinical psychology. 
Research Perspectives into Defense and Coping 
To sum up the research agenda related to adaptional processes, it would be helpful to 
see the following questions addressed by empirical research (non-exhaustive). 
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Are defenses and coping based on conscious or non-conscious processes, or both? 
Comparison between self-report and observer-rater methodology would shed light on this 
question. 
Is optimal adaptation, as operationalized, for instance, by symptoms or symptom 
change, associated to mature defenses and low frequencies of any coping? A clinical trial on 
defense and coping in patients undergoing psychotherapy or other treatment would help 
answer this question. 
Are defenses always related to internal conflicts; does coping always follows realistic 
anxiety? Concurrent assessment of conflicts, defenses and coping on the same clinical 
material would be of use. 
Are defenses best understood as state- and trait-dependent, whereas coping is after all 
state-dependent? Research into stability and change of defense and coping over time is 
needed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aimed to assess Cramer’s effort to address confusion in the concepts of 
defense and coping and proposes further elaborations on several of the related topics. As such, 
recent integrative models on defense and coping were presented and discussed. At this point, I 
should acknowledge possible limitations of the reviewing approach. The review heavily 
draws on the work by Cramer (1998a), and the literature was searched using the lenses 
adopted by this author in order to complement the first act by a second on the differences 
between defense and coping. An important literature exists that does not make any difference 
between the two concepts; as stated in the introduction, I decided not to include this literature; 
therefore, the conclusions may be biased. Moreover, the conclusions remain tentative, as there 
is very little empirical evidence, in clinical or general psychology, on the issue. Nevertheless, 
the review suggests that coping, as well as defense, can be – but need not be - unconscious for 
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the individual; empirical data point into this direction. The criteria of functionality and 
adaptiveness do not fundamentally differentiate defenses from coping; empirical data support 
this claim. However, the nature of the underlying fear theoretically differentiates defenses 
from coping. More generally, competence-related functioning is reflected by coping, whereas 
internal determinants of functioning are related to defenses. Stability over time is theoretically 
related to defenses as a personality-related concept, whereas change is related to the concept 
of coping, due to the status of the latter as a situation-induced adaptational process; empirical 
research has tentatively confirmed this claim. Should these conclusions be confirmed, they 
may have potential impact on clinical theories on adaptational processes. In this case, coping 
may be relevant when addressing short-term changes in patients undergoing psychotherapy, 
i.e., in crisis interventions, whereas defenses may be relevant when addressing long-term 
changes in these patients. The quality of the underlying fear is clinically also a relevant 
information which may be used in clinical practice and related to the nature of adaptational 
process. Finally, should empirical findings confirm the claims on defenses and coping, they 
may both be cogently integrated in various forms of psychotherapy, even if they stem from 
two different traditions.  
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